The State Must Weigh Factors Other Than Need and Cost-Effectiveness When Determining Future Funding for the System

REPORT NUMBER 2001-015, JANUARY 2003

Department of Social Services’ response as of December 2002

Chapter 111, Statutes of 2001, directed the Bureau of State Audits (bureau) to conduct an audit of the Department of Social Services’ (Social Services) Statewide Fingerprint Imaging System (SFIS). This system was designed to detect duplicate-aid fraud. The bureau was asked to report on the level of fraud detected through SFIS; the level of fraud deterrence resulting from SFIS; SFIS’s deterrence of eligible applicants, especially the immigrant population, from applying for public benefits; and SFIS’s cost-effectiveness.

Finding #1: Social Services did not know the extent of duplicate-aid fraud before implementing SFIS.

Before SFIS was in place, estimating how much duplicate-aid fraud actually existed in the State was difficult. Social Services was aware only of potential cases of duplicate-aid fraud that the counties brought to its attention. The methods the counties used to detect duplicate-aid fraud prior to SFIS met the federal requirement and were similar to those used in other states. According to our survey, the counties used computer matches as the primary method to detect possible duplicate-aid fraud, followed closely by tips from concerned citizens or other organizations. Data from the counties responding to our survey regarding the number of duplicate-aid fraud cases identified prior to the implementation of SFIS did not suggest to us that duplicate-aid fraud was a serious problem.

Social Services had a few options available for determining the known extent of duplicate-aid fraud in the State prior to implementing SFIS. For example, it could have surveyed the counties as we did or requested counties to analyze their Integrated Earnings Clearance/Fraud Detection System and...
DPA 266 data to determine the extent of duplicate-aid fraud. The DPA 266 is a report that tracks, among other things, statewide statistics on duplicate-aid investigation requests.

We raised concerns regarding the accuracy and completeness of the DPA 266 in our March 1995 report, titled *Department of Social Services: Review and Assessment of the Cost Effectiveness of AFDC Fraud Detection Programs*. Social Services has not resolved fully its problems with the DPA 266. Our survey results indicate that the counties do not report information consistently on the DPA 266, and therefore it is an unreliable report.

According to the chief of its fraud bureau, Social Services no longer verifies the accuracy of the information the counties report, because it does not consider the DPA 266 to be a statistical or claiming document but merely an activity report. However, this statement is inconsistent with Social Services’ instructions for completing the DPA 266, which state that information collected on the DPA 266 is used to prepare a federal program activity report and special reports for the Legislature. Specifically, federal regulations require state agencies to submit to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) an annual program activity statement that includes data on investigations of fraud. If Social Services had captured more detailed and reliable data using the DPA 266, it may have been able to present a clearer picture of the extent of duplicate-aid fraud identified by the counties.

To ensure that it reports accurate and complete information to the USDA, Social Services should require the fraud bureau to incorporate the review of DPA 266 data into its on-site visits to counties.

**Department Action: Pending.**

Social Services stated that it will add this function to its visits.

**Finding #2: During implementation, Social Services missed its opportunity to determine SFIS’s cost-effectiveness.**

Social Services and the Health and Human Services Agency Data Center (data center) did not capture critical data during the implementation phase that would have allowed them to quantify the savings attributable to SFIS. For example, each month two randomly selected groups of cases would be drawn from a subset of counties implementing SFIS over a six-month
period to establish a control group and an experimental group of recipients. Individuals in the control group would not be fingerprinted, but individuals in the experimental group would be fingerprinted. Then the amount of benefits paid to each group in the first calendar month in which SFIS had its full effect on the experimental group would be used to calculate an initial savings amount. The recidivism rate—the rate at which individuals previously terminated from receiving aid return to aid—would be tracked for each county for one year and used to adjust the initial savings.

The deputy director of Social Services’ Welfare-to-Work Division told us that in mandating SFIS, the Legislature did not provide any statutory authority or resources to require counties to collect data. Although we agree that state law mandating SFIS neither explicitly mandates the collection of data nor provides funding for these efforts, it does require Social Services and the data center to design, implement, and maintain the system. Moreover, other state laws and policies establish the State’s expectations for implementing information technology (IT) projects. For example, state law holds the head of each agency responsible for the management of IT in the agency that he or she heads, including the justification of proposed projects in terms of cost and benefits. Further, state policy requires agencies to establish reporting and evaluation procedures for each approved IT project and to prepare a post implementation evaluation report that measures the benefits and costs of a newly implemented IT system against the project objectives. The State does not consider a project complete until the Department of Finance approves the post implementation evaluation report. Data collection is a key component in preparing this report. Therefore, the data center and Social Services were remiss in not bringing the lack of authority and resources to the Legislature’s attention so they could effectively implement SFIS. Moreover, because counties did not begin to use SFIS until March 2000, roughly four years after the passage of the law, it is reasonable to conclude that the data center and Social Services had ample opportunity to do so.

To ensure that its implementation of future IT projects meets state expectations, Social Services and the data center should collect sufficient data to measure the benefits and costs against the project objectives. They also should identify promptly any obstacles that may prevent them from implementing effectively the project.
Department Action: Pending.

Social Services and the data center stated that they will continue to adhere to all appropriate IT policies and processes, and identify obstacles that may prevent an appropriate analysis of impacts of the IT project.

Finding #3: Incomplete cost data and a flawed method for estimating savings renders Social Services’ cost-benefit analysis for SFIS unreliable.

Social Services tracks some of the costs associated with SFIS, but it does not track county administrative costs. As a result, it does not know the full costs of operating SFIS. Further, because Social Services did not capture the data necessary to determine the savings attributable to SFIS during its implementation, Social Services developed an estimate based on the results of Los Angeles County’s AFIRM demonstration project. However, the methodology it used to estimate the State’s savings of roughly $150 million over five years for SFIS is flawed and therefore unreliable.

Although we were able to substantiate the data center’s and Social Services' costs, we were not able to determine the counties’ actual costs because Social Services did not require counties to track SFIS administrative costs separately. Social Services estimated that the total administrative costs that all counties except Los Angeles incurred for CalWORKs and the Food Stamp program for fiscal year 2000–01 would be roughly $1.8 million, yet Riverside County told us that its estimated costs for the same fiscal year were roughly $1.4 million; Riverside County alone estimated its costs as amounting to 78 percent of the costs Social Services estimated for 57 counties. Additionally, Social Services’ estimate does not include the cost that counties incur for investigating possible fraudulent activity. Furthermore, Social Services chose not to include any administrative costs for Los Angeles County in its estimate because the county had not yet implemented SFIS. Therefore, Social Services may be underestimating the cost of implementing and operating SFIS substantially.

Social Services’ November 2000 estimate also attempts to quantify benefits or savings that would accrue to the CalWORKs and Food Stamp programs. The estimate does not include savings attributable to the avoidance of duplicate-aid fraud in the Food Stamp program because the data was not available. Further, Social Services did not include savings resulting from Los Angeles County’s use of SFIS because the
county was not yet using SFIS when Social Services built the estimate. Finally, Social Services used data from Los Angeles County’s demonstration project to support key assumptions in its development of the SFIS savings estimate, which is inappropriate because it assumes that these conditions hold true in other counties. In fact, Social Services was unable to provide documentation to support some of its key assumptions.

To improve its management of SFIS, Social Services should identify the full costs of operating SFIS by requiring counties to track their administrative costs separately. To ensure that its estimates are representative of the entire state and its key assumptions are defensible, Social Services should study the conditions of a sample of counties instead of assuming that conditions in one county hold true in other counties and maintain adequate documentation, such as time studies or other empirical data to support its estimates.

**Department Action: Pending.**

Social Services disagreed that it should separately track SFIS administrative costs, stating that these costs are included in general eligibility determination activities in the State’s federally approved cost allocation plan. Social Services’ failure to recognize the importance of these costs causes us concern. Until Social Services understands the total cost of operating SFIS, the State cannot properly evaluate the system in terms of costs and benefits.

Social Services agreed that maintaining adequate documentation to support its estimates is important and asserted that it has processes in place to assure that assumptions are appropriately documented.

Social Services did not state clearly the actions it will take to address our recommendations. It is our expectation that Social Services will provide a corrective action plan in its 60-day response, which is due March 2003.

**Finding #4: The majority of matches SFIS identifies are administrative errors, and the actual level of fraud it detects is quite small.**

Although Social Services does not know how many applicants SFIS deters from attempting to receive duplicate-aid, it can determine the number of applicants that SFIS detected who
were attempting to receive duplicate aid. However, we found that the actual number of matches SFIS has identified as possible fraudulent activity is substantially fewer than the number of matches it identifies as administrative errors made by county staff. Between March 1, 2000, and September 30, 2002, SFIS detected a total of 25,202 matches, 7,045 which were still pending resolution as of September 30, 2002. Of the remaining 18,157 items with a final disposition, staff identified only 478 of the items, or roughly 3 percent, as possible fraud situations. Further, investigators found fraud in only 45 of the 478 possible fraud items, just 0.2 percent of the 18,157 items resolved, according to SFIS reports. In order to determine how long items had been pending resolution, we asked for an aging report as of October 21, 2002. We found that roughly 3,000 of the 4,920 matches shown as pending resolution in SFIS were more than 99 days old, and 1,100 had been pending for a year or more.

Social Services told us that it generates monthly reports from SFIS that allow it to see whether counties are investigating and resolving discrepancies but that it reviews these reports in detail only twice a year. Moreover, although Social Services provides training and instructs counties to promptly resolve any matches that SFIS identifies, it does not have a regulation, policy, or set of procedures requiring counties to do so. Additionally, Social Services has yet to develop written procedures for its own staff to follow when reviewing reports that SFIS generates. Without policies and procedures, Social Services cannot ensure that SFIS information remains current, which can diminish its usefulness.

To improve its management of SFIS, Social Services should establish policies and procedures that require counties to resolve pending items in the resolution queue promptly. Additionally, the fraud bureau should develop written procedures for its staff to follow up on items pending in the resolution queue. The procedures should include fraud bureau staff requesting a monthly aging report to use as a tool to determine whether items pending in the resolution queue are current and, if necessary, contacting the appropriate counties. Furthermore, Social Services should ensure that counties investigate and record the outcomes of their investigations in SFIS.
Department Action: Pending.
Social Services stated that it has already initiated action to develop a monthly aging report to use as a tool to determine if items pending in the resolution queue are current. Social Services also states that it will continue its efforts to ensure that counties promptly resolve pending items in the SFIS resolution queue, and will assess the need for developing written procedures for fraud bureau staff.

Finding #5: Social Services does not collect the data it needs to determine if it is successful in reaching its Food Stamp program target populations.
California’s Legislature voiced its concern over low participation rates by requiring Social Services to develop a community outreach and education campaign to help families learn about and apply for the Food Stamp program. In an annual report to the Legislature dated April 1, 2002, Social Services stated that it believes its outreach efforts have had an effect on increasing the number of applications received and the caseload of the Food Stamp program. However, the Legislature specifically instructed Social Services to identify target populations and report on the results of its outreach efforts. Social Services identified two target populations: families terminating from CalWORKs and legal noncitizens. Although Social Services recognizes that the ultimate measurement of its outreach efforts’ success depends on its ability to reach the target population, it did not collect data to evaluate the participation rates of these two populations. Instead, it chose to rely on the USDA’s report of estimated state Food Stamp program participation rates, which presents information that is up to three years old. Furthermore, the USDA’s report does not have information specific to Social Services’ target populations. Therefore, Social Services does not know if its efforts to reach legal noncitizens have been successful.

To report accurately the results of its community outreach and education efforts to the Legislature, Social Services should establish a mechanism to track the participation rates of the target populations.
Finding #6: Decision makers should consider the benefits and drawbacks of SFIS when deciding future funding for the system.

The primary benefits that the State derives from continuing to use SFIS are the proven effectiveness of fingerprint imaging technology to identify duplicate fingerprints and its ability to identify applicants who may travel from county to county seeking duplicate aid. However, several factors could also support discontinuing the use of SFIS. For one, the State is spending $11.4 million or more annually to operate SFIS without knowing the actual savings that it may be producing. Additionally, although we were not able to verify some of the concerns that opponents of SFIS raised, other concerns appear valid. For example, the fingerprint imaging requirement may add an element of fear to the welfare application process and thus may keep some eligible people from applying for needed benefits. The State must weigh these factors in deciding whether to continue to fund SFIS.

The Legislature should consider the pros and cons of repealing state law requiring fingerprint imaging, including whether SFIS is consistent with the State’s community outreach and education campaign efforts for the Food Stamp program. To assist the Legislature in its consideration of the pros and cons of repealing state law requiring fingerprint imaging, Social Services and the data center should report on the full costs associated with discontinuing SFIS.

Legislative Action: Unknown.

We are unaware of any legislative action implementing this recommendation.
Department Action: Pending

Social Services agreed, but stated that it has previously provided this information to the Legislature. Social Services did not state clearly the actions it will take to address our recommendation. It is our expectation that Social Services will provide a corrective action plan in its 60-day response to the audit, which is due March 2003.